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banking institution as truste and placed it in the hands of an individual, the
same person who had been deprived of his beneficial interest in the trust. "(I) t is
a well-settled principle that a trustee ... is under a duty to deal impartially with
... beneficiaries .. and successive interests ...,2o The court's decision admits of
the possibility of a violation of the trustee's duty as to impartiality and seeks to
avoid this by the substitution of trustees. However, by making this substitution
the court has probably increased the possibility of impartiality, but to the bene-
ficiaries rather than to the remaindermen. Its holding would seem to suggest that
since there is a danger of partiality, the remaindermen's superior interests de-
serve protection over the beneficiaries' without regard for the degree of possible
partiality to each. The writer suggests that the banking institution would have
been the more impartial of the two trustees in this case, and that the degree of
impartiality to each interest should have been the chief consideration rather than
a mere protection of the remaindermen from the possibility of partiality without
regard for the danger to the beneficiaries.
Non-Final Order
Construction of Hallock's Wil 21 was an appeal from an order of the Appel-
late Division22 unani*ously reversing, on the law, a decree of the Surrogate's
Court in a will construction proceeding. The Appellate Division remitted the
proceeding "to the Surrogate's Court for the determination of allowances, costs
and interest, and the entry of decree." (Emphasis supplied).
Where the Appellate Division order is final within the meaning of the Con-
stitution,23 its order would be appealable, notwithstanding the fact that it remitted
the case to the Surrogate's Court for entry of a decree.24 Remission for the deter-
mination of costs and allowances would not affect finality, since the Surrogate in
his decree expressly reserved these matters "for supplemental decree."25 However,
remission for the purpose of determining interest rendered the Appellate Division
order nonfinal.
20. 33 Ai. JUR., Life Estates, Remainders, and Reversion § 216 (1941).
21. 308 N. Y. 29.9, 125 N. E. 2d. 578 (1955).
22. 283 App. Div. 1091, 131 N. Y. S. 2d 585 (2d Dep't 1954).
23. N. Y. CoNsT. art. VI, § 7. Jurisdiction of court of appeals: "In civil cases
and proceedings as follows: (1) As of right, from a judgment or order entered
upon the decision of an appellate division of the supreme court which finafly
determines an action or special proceeding ... where the judgment or order Is
one of reversal or modification" (Emphasis supplied). Also, C. P. A. § 588.
24. C. P. A. § 591, subd. 2, as amended by L. 1953, ch. 417. The rule was other-
wise prior to the 1953 Amendment, Matter of Mittelstaedt's WiZl, 304 N. Y. 795,
109 N. E. 2d 86 (1952); Matter of Bishop's Wil, 301 N. Y. 498, 95 N. E. 2d 817,
(1950).
25. SURROGATa'S CourT Acr § 278.
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The determination of interest is governed by the second paragraph of section
218 of the Surrogate's Court Act, which involves some discretion on the part of
the Surrogate. 26 Because of this, the Court of Appeals found that it had no power
to determine interest, and until it was fixed by the Surrogate there was "dearly"
the absence of finality in the order appealed fromY1
Since the determination of interest involves a discretionary choice on the
part of the Surrogate, more is involved than merely a "ministerial" act of the
Surrogate. Therefore, even though the discretionary area is as limited as it is, an
exercise of discretion is still required, which provides adequate ground for a
finding of a non-final order.
Summary Judgment
In In re Pascal's Will,28 contestants made a motion for summary judgment in a
probate proceeding,29 based on the argument that the instrument offered for pro-
bate was never effective as a will. It was to take effect only on condition that
decedent died on "this my trip to India;" and contestants argued that the condition
never occurred since decedent died before the trip, and therefore there was no
triable issue of fact.
The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division 0 which had granted
the motion. The courts were in agreement that a contestant in a surrogate's pro-
ceeding could invoke the provisions of rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice
whenever appropriate.8 ' However, a will is properly admitted to probate when
the Surrogate is "satisfied with the genuineness of the will, and the validity of its
26. Id. § 218, interest on a legacy shall be "at the rate of three per centum
per annum unless the delay in payment was unreasonable, in which event interest
shall be at the legal rate for the period of such unreasonable delay."
27. COHEN & KARGER, PowERs OF THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS, § 11 (2d
ed. 1952), especially at 45-46. "As in actions, finality is held to be absent though
the remission for a new hearing or for further proceedings is limited to one of
several Issues, the remaining being concluded by the Appellate Division. Thus,
the Appellate Division may sustain the right of a claimant to relief and remit
solely for the purpose of fixing the amount to be awarded or allowed; the order
is nevertheless not final."
28. 309 N. Y. 108, 127 N. E. 2d 835 (1955).
29. Under RULEs Civ. PRAC. 113.
30. 285 App. Div. 456, 137 N. Y. S. 2d 386 (1st Dep't 1955).
31. SURROGATE'S COURT Acr § 316; RULES Civ. PRAc. 3; 113 (4); Lederer v.
Wise Shoe Co., 276 N. Y. 459, 12 N. E. 2d 544 (1938); Riley v. Southern. Transp.
Co., 278 App. Div. 605, 101 N. Y. S. 2d 906 (3rd Dep't 1951); Matter of Fishkind,
271 App. Div. 1013, 68 N. Y. S. 2d 247 (2d Dep't 1947); see People ex Tel. Lewis
v. Fowler, 229 N.Y. 84, 127 N. E. 793 (1920).
